In October 2026, the Texas Supreme Court clarified the category of third-parties that may enforce arbitration agreements. In UATP Management, LLC, et al. v. Geter, Cause No. 24-0905, 2026 WL 3090324 (Tex., Oct 16, 2026), the Court held that dispute resolution clauses which do not specifically name third parties may nonetheless be enforced by them when the clauses are mechanisms to enforce the benefits conferred elsewhere in the agreement. Before addressing the third-party issue, the Court reviewed several other principals and holdings regarding arbitration agreements, clarifying them along the way.

Courts, not Arbitrators, Decide whether a Dispute is Arbitrable

While parties may agree to delegate questions about the scope of an arbitration agreement to arbitrators, the Texas Supreme Court held that the decision of whether non-signatories can invoke an arbitration agreement is for the courts, not arbitrators, to decide. UATP Management, LLC, at P.6. Whether a non-signatory can compel arbitration raises questions of whether an agreement to arbitrate exists between the parties. Cerna ex rel. R.W. v. Pearland Urb. Air, LLC, 714 S.W.3d 585, 589 (Tex. 2025). And, whether a valid arbitration agreement exists between the parties is a “gateway” decision that a court, not an arbitrator, must decide. G.T. Leach Builders, LLC v. Sapphire V.P., LP, 458 S.W.3d 502, 524 (Tex. 2015).

Texas Law Allows Third-Parties to Arbitrate          

The Texas Supreme Court reiterated the six means by which parties who did not sign an arbitration agreement (so-called non-signatories) can nonetheless compel arbitration. Those categories include (1) incorporation by reference, (2) assumption, (3) agency, (4) alter ego, (5) equitable estoppel, and (6) third-party beneficiary. Jody James Farms, JV v. Altman Grp., Inc., 547 S.W.3d 624, 633 (Tex. 2018).

A Parent may Bind a Minor Child to Arbitrate

Citing to the Texas Family Code and earlier precedent, the Court held that parents may bind their minor children to arbitrate disputes. UATP Management, LLC, at P.4-5.; Tex. Fam. Code § 151.001(a)(7); Taylor Morrison of Texas, Inc. v. Ha, 660 S.W.3d 529, 534 (Tex. 2023) (parents’ rights include making decisions of substantial legal significance concerning their children).

The Question before the Court

The issue before the Texas Supreme Court was whether the mother of a minor child could be forced to arbitrate a dispute with non-signatories to an arbitration agreement. Chiniqua Geter sued on behalf of her minor daughter, K.G., for injuries K.G. sustained while playing at an Urban Air trampoline park in Beaumont, Texas. The named defendants included Beaumont Adventure Park Urban Air LLC (Beaumont Urban Air),  UATP Management, LLC, UATP IP, LLC,  UA Attractions, LLC, Rachelle Nurse-Goodly, and Joseph Goodly.

Before entering the play area of the park, Geter signed a release and indemnification agreement in favor of Beaumont Urban Air on behalf of K.G. The release and indemnity provision in the agreement identified all the defendants as, “protected parties”. Geter, in signing the agreement, agreed that she “releases, agrees not to sue, and shall indemnify Urban Air, UATP Management, LLC, UATP IP, LLC, UA Attractions, LLC, [and] the legal owner of the premises . . . (collectively, protected parties).”

The agreement further contained an arbitration provision providing that “[a]ny dispute or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement, breach thereof, the Premises, Activities, property damage (real or personal), personal injury (including death), or the scope, arbitrability, or validity of this arbitration agreement . . . shall be . . . settled by binding arbitration before a single arbitrator” under the Federal Arbitration Act.”

All the defendants moved to compel arbitration under the release agreement, and the trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed as to Beaumont Urban Air, holding that an arbitration agreement existed between it and K.G., the minor child. The court further held, however, that the remaining “protected parties” had no contractual right to compel arbitration and therefore, denied the motion to compel arbitration as to them.

The Texas Supreme Court’s Decision

Looking at the six means by which a non-signatory can compel arbitration, the Texas Supreme Court zeroed in on whether any of the “protected parties” could be properly characterized as third-party beneficiaries to the agreement Geter signed with Beaumont Urban Air. Under longstanding Texas law, third-party beneficiaries may enforce arbitration agreements “so long as ‘the parties to the contract intended to secure a benefit to that third party and entered into the contract directly for the third party’s benefit.’” Jody James Farms, JV, 547 S.W.3d at 635 (quoting In re Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 195 S.W.3d 672, 677 (Tex. 2006)).  The benefit must be more than incidental; there must be clear intent to confer a direct benefit to a third party.  Jody James Farms, JV, 547 S.W.3d at 635.

In this case, the Geter agreed to release and indemnify each of the “protected parties”. However, the arbitration agreement did not reference the “protected parties”. but instead, more generally the “parties”. The Texas Supreme Court held that reference to, “parties”, did not exclude the “protected parties”. When construing the contract as a whole, the Court held that, “it follows that the protected parties may enforce the arbitration agreement as third-party beneficiaries; arbitration is the parties’ chosen means of enforcing the agreement’s release and indemnification provision.” UATP Management, LLC  at P.8.

The Significance of the Texas Supreme Court’s Decision

The Texas Supreme Court bootstrapped numerous prior decisions to reach its conclusion that the non-signatories in this case could compel arbitration. Only by agreeing with the premise that an arbitration agreement is merely a means of enforcing rights or remedies contained elsewhere in a contract, was the Court able to reach the conclusion that Geter agreed to arbitrate all claims against all the defendants, signatories and non-signatories alike. Notably, the agreement Geter entered into on behalf of K.G. was not a model of clarity. If the arbitration agreement had referenced “protected parties” rather than “parties”, the dispute would probably have never reached the Supreme Court. Litigants seeking to compel arbitration with similarly vague arbitration agreements will likely glom onto the UATP Management, LLC Court’s willingness to interpret arbitration clauses as mere enforcement mechanisms for other rights and remedies contained elsewhere in contracts.

Cites

Tex. Fam. Code § 151.001(a)(7)

UATP Management, LLC, et al. v. Geter, Cause No. 24-0905, 2026 WL 3090324 (Tex., Oct 16, 2026)

Cerna ex rel. R.W. v. Pearland Urb. Air, LLC, 714 S.W.3d 585, 589 (Tex. 2025)

G.T. Leach Builders, LLC v. Sapphire V.P., LP, 458 S.W.3d 502, 524 (Tex. 2015)

Jody James Farms, JV v. Altman Grp., Inc., 547 S.W.3d 624, 633 (Tex. 2018)

Taylor Morrison of Texas, Inc. v. Ha, 660 S.W.3d 529, 534 (Tex. 2023)

In re Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 195 S.W.3d 672, 677 (Tex. 2006)

 

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